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Abstract
This paper builds a model of emerging market crises in which ﬁrms
are credit constrained and the monetary authorities are limited in their
access to foreign currency. The eﬀects of these constraints and their
interaction are analyzed in a small open economy that is subject to
external shocks and in which capital ﬂows derive out of international
investors’ lending decisions to ﬁrms. A crisis can occur both directly
from a shock, or due to a change in market perceptions. The economy,
however, is only aﬀected by a change in market perceptions and thus
vulnerable to a slowdown in inﬂows of foreign currency when it has
high levels of foreign debt and low holdings of international reserves.
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11 Introduction
Recent crises in emerging market economies have motivated new research in
a number of directions in modelling crises. Typical factors at work in earlier
crises have been notably absent, particularly in the countries hit by crisis in
East Asia. For example, none of the ﬁve ’crisis countries’ in Asia1 suﬀered
from large ﬁscal deﬁcits nor any other large, macro-oriented imbalance. This
recognition, that macroeconomic factors may not have been at the core of
these crises, has placed emphasis in newer crisis research on more micro-
oriented, ﬁnancial areas.
Two inﬂuential strands in newer crisis literature are those emphasizing
liquidity shortages and ﬁrm balance sheet diﬃculties. Chang and Velasco
(2000) deﬁne international illiquidity as ”a situation in which a country’s
consolidated ﬁnancial system has potential short-term obligations in foreign
currency that exceed the amount of foreign currency it can have access to
on short notice.” Their theoretical framework(Chang and Velasco (1998),
Chang and Velasco (2000)) revolves around a maturity mismatch between
banks’ assets and liabilities, and costly liquidation of investment projects.
A bank run creates a liquidity crisis, forcing the liquidation of longer term
projects and possibly the bankruptcy of banks.
Balance sheet diﬃculties, as illustrated by, eg. Krugman (1999), involve
constraints on ﬁrm borrowing and the eﬀects of changes in the real exchange
rate, via capital ﬂows and aggregate demand, on ﬁrm balance sheets. An
important factor is the presence of a substantial portion of foreign currency
denominated debt among ﬁrms’ liabilities2. A decline in capital ﬂows leads
to a decline in investment, which causes the real exchange rate to depreciate,
hurting ﬁrm balance sheets.
This paper builds on the balance sheet approach to modelling emerging
market crises. However, I argue that depreciations in the real exchange rate
are not solely due to a fall in the demand for domestic goods. They also
represent a shortage of foreign currency - a decline in the inﬂow of foreign
exchange that suddenly leaves the country unable to ﬁnance capital outﬂows
at the prevailing exchange rate. As a provider of foreign currency for the
economy, the central bank’s holdings of international reserves play a central
1Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Phillipines. A comprehensive analysis
of the economic conditions in these countries can be found in, eg. Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini (1998a), Radelet and Sachs (1998) and IMF (1997).
2The motivation for this is the fact that loans to developing and emerging economies
are seldom denominated in domestic currency. See eg. Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein
(2000). There has been little theoretical research on why this is the case for the private
sector. See though Jeanne (2000), Jeanne (1999), and Chamon (2001).
2role in this story. This paper is then an analysis of the eﬀects of constraints
on ﬁrm balance sheets and limits to the central bank’s access to foreign
currency, and their interaction.
Wealth constraints in this model amplify the eﬀects of shocks along the
lines of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998), which they call the ”ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism”. A shock to exports is propagated via adverse eﬀects
on ﬁrm balance sheets, constraining ﬁrm spending in the next period and
leading to a decline in prices and output.
Shocks to ﬁrm balance sheets, by aﬀecting aggregate levels of capital
ﬂows, also magnify eﬀects on the external account. If ﬁrms are highly
leveraged, this eﬀect can be quite strong and lead to large diﬀerences in the
behavior of the external account compared to in the absence of credit mar-
ket imperfections. A temporary shock to exports, for example, that does
not aﬀect the expected future returns to investment, would not aﬀect capi-
tal inﬂows in the absence of credit market imperfections. When ﬁrms are
credit constrained, capital ﬂows may instead fall dramatically; this implies
that the size of a real shock necessary to lead to a crisis is much less in this
case. Additionally, through their eﬀects on capital ﬂows, ﬁrm balance sheet
constraints will increase the size of a devaluation should one occur. The
negative feedback of a devaluation on balance sheets and back on the ex-
change rate thus provides an explanation for the large nominal depreciations
observed in recent crises.
This analysis is related to a number of papers on crises, in particular
those concerned with ﬁrm balance sheets, eg. Krugman (1999) and Aghion,
Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2000). Krugman (1999) illustrates the role of
balance sheets and foreign currency debt in emerging market crises. Firm
investment is constrained by end of period wealth, while ﬁrm wealth (cash
ﬂo w )i sa ﬀected by this same investment, via its eﬀects on aggregate demand
and the real exchange rate. The potential for multiple equilibria quickly
becomes apparent. If lenders are concerned about ﬁrm balance sheets, they
reduce lending. This leads to a contraction in investment and aggregate
demand. The fall in demand causes a real depreciation, damaging ﬁrm
balance sheets and thereby justifying lenders’ concerns.
While changes in the demand for domestic produced goods provides sig-
niﬁcant means by which ﬁrm balance sheets can be impacted, the large de-
preciations that we see in many emerging market crises suggest that other
forces are at work as well. I will argue in this paper that initial exchange rate
depreciations reﬂect to a large degree a sort of disequilibrium. The real de-
preciations experienced in these countries in the event of crises has less to do
with a decline in the demand for home goods and more to do with a shortage
in foreign currency following a sudden decline in capital ﬂows, which then
3causes the price of foreign currency, the exchange rate, to increase greatly.
Modelling the actual crisis, or devaluation, as a sudden shortage of foreign
currency (or a case of ”international illiquidity”) gives additional insights. It
provides a clear role for reserves in aﬀecting the risk of crisis and also the
lending decisions of international investors. Also, foreign currency debt adds
to the problem in an extra way here. Not only does it lead to a worsening
of balance sheets; by adding to the amount of foreign currency that must be
ﬁnanced, it adds to the problem of international illiquidity and the eﬀect on
t h ee x c h a n g er a t e .
T h er e m a i n d e ro ft h ep a p e ri sa sf o l l o w s . S e c t i o n2g i v e sa no u t l i n eo f
the model with its main assumptions and mechanisms. Section 3 presents
the basic framework of the model. Section 4 shows how the interest rate
and default rate are derived. In section 5 this framework is then used to
show how a crisis can occur. Section 6 concludes and discusses some possible
extensions.
2 A small open economy with wealth con-
straints
2.1 An outline of the model
The basic structure behind the model is the following. The authorities main-
tain a ﬁxed exchange rate3. Additionally, the authorities are limited in their
access to foreign currency. To be concrete, I assume that the authorities
are unable to borrow any funds from abroad4. Thus, if total net outﬂows
of foreign currency (ie. the balance of payments deﬁcit) are greater than in-
ternational reserves, then the authorities will be forced to ﬂoat the exchange
rate.
There are two types of agents in the economy, workers and capitalists.
Workers supply labor and their only source of income is wage earnings. Cap-
italists own ﬁrms and do not consume. The ﬁrms produce goods using
intermediate goods and labor. Goods can then either be used for consump-
tion or as intermediate goods in other ﬁrms’ production.
It is assumed that ﬁrms’ wealth is insuﬃcient to ﬁnance intermediate
goods purchases and they thus must borrow the remainder from abroad.
3While this is a monetary model, we maintain very simple assumptions on the monetary
s i d ea n da s s u m eav e r yp a s s i v er o l ef o rt h ea uthorites. They are assumed to change the
money supply in accordance with exchange rate commitments, implying that domestic
money changes one for one with international reserves.
4This will be discussed in more detail later in the paper.
4Loans are assumed to be denominated in foreign currency. I assume that
ﬁrms must secure this external ﬁnancing for intermediate goods purchases
one period in advance.
This assumption on the timing of loans is slightly diﬀerent from that
assumed in Krugman (1999). It reﬂects the view that a currency crisis is
the result of the interaction of ﬁrm balance sheets and the authorities limited
access to foreign currency. While the source of the crisis may be rooted in
balance sheet diﬃculties, the actual exchange rate depreciation is due to
”international illiquidity”. Assuming that ﬁrms must contract loans one
period in advance allows us to separate the eﬀects of capital ﬂows on the
external account (same period) and on aggregate demand and the relative
p r i c eo fh o m eg o o d s( n e x tp e r i o d ) .
External shocks to the demand for exports aﬀect aggregate demand which
in turn impacts ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow. Balance sheet eﬀects amplify the trade
balance eﬀect of shocks on the external account, via their eﬀect on capital
ﬂows. The eﬀe c t so fs h o c k st h e nc a r r yi n t ot h en e x tp e r i o di nt w ow a y s .
Changes in capital ﬂows aﬀect investment, or the purchase of intermediate
goods, in the next period. Additionally, changes in ﬁrm balance sheets and
the external account aﬀect ﬁrm default risk and thus also interest rates.
If ﬁrms’ wealth is less than or equal to zero, then they must default. In
determining loan rates, lenders form expectations of default based on the
distribution of shocks to exports and on the authorities’ ability to sustain
the ﬁxed exchange rate.
A balance of payments crisis can occur in one of two ways. A shock
to exports, both via a worsening of the trade balance and through adverse
eﬀects on capital ﬂows, can lead to a balance of payments deﬁcit so large that
the authorities are forced to ﬂo a tt h ee x c h a n g er a t e . H e r ei ti si m p o r t a n tt o
emphasize the amplifying eﬀect that balance sheets have on external shocks.
In some cases there can be multiple equilibria, in which a change in mar-
ket sentiment can cause a shift to the ’crisis’ equilibrium. It will be seen
later that there two solutions to the equilibrium interest rate and probability
of default; a ’low’ or ’normal’ equilibrium with a low interest rate and de-
fault probability, and a ’high’ or ’crisis’ equilibrium with a high interest rate
and default probability, and possibly also a decline in capital ﬂows. How-
ever, the high solution is not always a competitive equilibrium as lenders
may be able to increase expected returns by lowering interest rates (which
would then push interest rates down to the low equilibrium). The decisive
factor in determining whether multiple equilibria are possible is the relative
sensitivity of a ﬁrm’s default rate to the individual ﬁrm’s interest rate as
opposed to aggregate factors that determine the likelihood and potential size
of a devaluation. If devaluation expectations’ eﬀect on ﬁrm default rate is
5strong, then a decline in ’market sentiment’ can be self-validating.
2.2 Production and wealth
There are two countries, Home and Foreign. There are n identical ﬁrms in





t 0 < β < 1 (1)
where Kt is capital inputs and Lt is labor.
Both Home and Foreign produce composite goods competitively ( home
and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes) that can either be used as in-
puts in production or consumed. Firms must secure ﬁnancing for nominal
intermediate goods purchases, It, one period in advance.
Firms purchase both home and foreign capital inputs, KH,t and KF,t
according to Cobb Douglas preferences, Kt = K
1−α
H,t Kα
F,t, and subject to the
budget constraint, It = PH,tKH,t + PF,tKF,t,w h e r eIt is investment (or total
input purchases), and PH,t and PF,t are the domestic currency prices of home
and foreign capital inputs6, respectively. α and 1−α are the share of foreign
and domestic goods, respectively, in ﬁrm input purchases (and, as we state














F,t ; 0 < α < 1 (2)
where PH,tKH,t =( 1−α)It and PF,tKF,t = αIt. Pt is then the producer (and
as we will note later, also the consumer) price index for Home. Nominal
wages, Wt, are sticky while prices are ﬂexible, and the law of one price holds
for both home and foreign goods; PH,t = StP∗
H,tand PF,t = StP∗
F,t,w h e r eSt
is the nominal exchange rate (units of domestic currency per unit of foreign
currency). The foreign currency price of foreign goods, P∗
F,t, is assumed
constant and is normalized to one. Denote the ﬁxed exchange rate as S,
which is also set equal to one.
Firms end period t with weal t hi nd o m e s t i cc u r r e n c y ,Bt. Investment
in excess of ﬁrm wealth is ﬁnanced by loaning abroad in foreign currency.
Assume that internal funds are insuﬃcient to ﬁnance investment, so that
5These are ﬁrm speciﬁc values. Aggregate values of these variables will be denoted by
a bar, so that, eg. aggregate output is given by Yt = nYt.
6Since these are composite goods, these are also the prices of home and foreign ﬁnal
goods.
6It >B t−1. Due to problems of moral hazard, ﬁrms are credit constrained,
with the maximum amount they can borrow depending on ﬁrm wealth;
It ≤ (1 + µ)Bt−1 (3)
where µ is taken as given. The wealth constraint, (3), will be binding
when the expected marginal return of capital is greater than the interest
rate. We will assume in this paper that this is in general the case, that
It =( 1+µ)Bt−1 and St−1Ft−1 = µBt−1.H o w e v e r , i f t h e r e i s a l a r g e
increase in the interest rate, the wealth constraint may not be binding, so
that ﬁrms’ optimal investment implies Ft−1 <µ B t−1.
Bt is equal to sales in period t minus wage costs and the repayment of
debt taken in t-1. Then we have,
Bt = PH,tYt − WtLt − rt−1StFt−1 (4)
where PH,tYt is the home ﬁrm’s nominal income (or sales proceeds), WtLt is
wage costs, Ft−1 is foreign debt denominated in foreign currency, and rt−1
is the gross (nominal) loan rate charged on foreign currency loans. As
mentioned above, prices in Foreign are assumed constant7,s ot h a tt h e( r i s k
free) interest rate, r∗
t, is both Foreign’s nominal and real (risk free) interest
rate. We assume that the exchange rate is ﬁx e da tt h es t a r to fe a c hp e r i o d .
Thus, loans taken the period before are at St−1 = S =1 . However, due to
shocks, there may be a positive probability that a balance of payments crisis
will occur. Hence, the domestic currency value of (foreign currency) debt at
the time of repayment is written rt−1StFt−1, as given by (4)8.
Here I can comment on the timing of the model. As will become clear
later, both exports and an eventual devaluation aﬀect input purchases and
labor demand. This then implies that the determination of output, prices,
exports, capital ﬂows, etc., occurs at the same time. Though, it must be clear
that I assume that new loans (and thus aggregate capital ﬂo w s )a r em a d ea t
time t with the knowledge of export demand, Xt. A balance of payments
crisis at time t then, if it occurs, will take place upon the realization of Xt
and the determination of capital ﬂows.
7Changes in home prices have a negligible eﬀect on the foreign price index, so that the
foreign consumer price index is eﬀectively P∗
t = P∗
F,t =1 .
8I assume that the purchase of foreign and domestic goods in Home are done with
domestic currency, and thus that Ft−1 is immediately exchanged (ie. at time t-1) and is
in domestic currency at the start of time t.
72.3 Market clearing, wages and exports
Assume that workers spend all their income each period, consuming both
home and foreign goods according to Cobb-Douglas preferences (with the
same shares as with ﬁrms’ demand for intermediate goods), while ﬁrms do
not consume, reinvesting all proﬁts. This assumption is made for simplicity
and follows Krugman (1999) and Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2000).
I nt h es a m ew a ya sw i t hﬁrm demand for inputs, we can solve the problem
of the consumer, which is to maximize Ct = C
1−α
H,t Cα
F,t subject to the budget
constraint, WtLt = PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t,w h e r eCH,t,C F,t are Home consump-
tion of home and foreign goods, respectively. Then, aggregate consumption
is given by9





and PH,tCH,t =( 1 − α)WtLt, PF,tCF,t = αWtLt












that the share of home goods in foreign consumption is negligible, or α∗ '
1, which implies that P∗
t = PF,t =1(since we normalize it to 1) Since
PH,t = StP∗
H,t,w eh a v et h a tP∗
H,t =
PH,t
St . As with domestic consumption,
assume that there is also unitary elasticity of substitution between home and
f o r e i g ng o o d si nF o r e i g n 10. This implies that Foreign spends a constant
share of its total consumption expenditure on Home and Foreign goods, ie..
P∗
H,tC∗






t . The foreign currency
value of Foreign consumption of home goods, ie. exports, can then be seen





H,t and ’real’ exports are then C∗
H,t = St
PH,tXt.
Aggregate exports, Xt, are assumed to be exogenous to Home and subject
to random shocks.
Market clearing for home goods is then such that output is equal to
domestic consumption and investment demand, and export demand;
PH,tYt = PH,tCH,t + PH,tKH,t + PH,tC
∗
H,t
We can then insert expressions for home consumption, (5), and investment
demand, and for export demand;
PH,tYt =( 1− α)WtLt +( 1− α)It + StXt (6)
9Pt is as deﬁned above.
10This follows Krugman (1999).
8Assume that Wt i ss e ta tt h ee n do fp e r i o dt - 1 11 and then cannot be changed
again until the end of period t. Additionally, assume that labor in each
period will then be determined by ﬁrms’ demand and that ﬁrms are always
a b l et oe m p l o yt h ea m o u n to fl a b o rt h a tm a x i m i z e sp r o ﬁts, so that WtLt =
(1 − β)PH,tYt holds in all periods.
Using this and (6), nominal output is,
PH,tYt =
1
α + β(1 − α)
£
(1 − α)It + StXt
¤
(7)
Since loans are taken prior to the realization of Xt, It = Bt−1 + Ft−1 (ie. It
is determined in t-1 ).
2.4 Balance of Payments
The domestic value of international reserves is IRt = StRt,w h e r eRt is
foreign currency reserves. Reserves at the end of period t, IRt,w i l lb e
determined by IRt−1 plus the trade balance, StXt − Mt,( w h e r eMt is total
imports) and inﬂows, StFt, minus the repayment of loans from period t-1,
rt−1StFt−1.
IRt = StRt = StRt−1 + StFt + StXt − Mt − rt−1StFt−1 (8)
Using (5) and (6) we can see that,
Mt = PF,tCF,t + PF,tKF,t = αWtLt + αIt
=
α(1 − β)
α + β(1 − α)
StXt +
α
α + β(1 − α)
It (9)
Inserting (9) into (8) we have the following equation for reserves;




2.4.1 Condition for a balance of payments crisis to occur
As stated above, the condition for sustaining the ﬁxed exchange rate is
(where S =1 )
IRt ≤ 0 ⇔ Rt−1 + Ft + Xt ≤ Mt + rt−1Ft−1
If IRt ≤ 0, then the authorities will be forced to ﬂoat the exchange rate.
This assumption captures in a simple way the idea that emerging markets
11And thus also prior to the realization of Xt.
9are limited in their access to foreign currency, and that the size of interna-
tional reserves (in relation to net foreign currency obligations) thus have an
important impact on devaluation expectations. By making this assumption
we are able to incorporate developments in the balance of payments and re-
serves into lenders’ calculation of the risk of devaluation, and thereby also
default risk.
This allows the analysis of lender behavior and the determination of cap-
ital ﬂows in an economy where there are both ﬁrm credit constraints and
an international constraint on access to foreign currency. However, this
framework does not allow a more in depth analysis of the problem of the
policymaker, in particular the use of the short term interest rate in defense
of a currency peg.
2.5 Summary
This then comprises the basic framework of the model. Firms’ investment is
constrained by their wealth. Capital ﬂows, or aggregate borrowing, are then
determined by aggregate ﬁrm wealth. The authorities are unable to borrow
foreign currency from abroad and if international reserves become negative
then the exchange rate is ﬂoated. All borrowing is in foreign currency,
making ﬁrms potentially vulnerable to exchange rate depreciation.
Firms’ cash ﬂow is aﬀected by changes in both investment demand and
f o r e i g nd e m a n d . F o r e i g nd e m a n di sa s s u m e de x o g e n o u sa n ds u b j e c tt o
random shocks. The eﬀect of a decrease in export demand is multiplied by
its eﬀect on labor demand and wage income. A deterioration in ﬁrm balance
sheets, brought on by a fall in exports, decreases capital ﬂows and next period
investment. The decrease in aggregate investment demand reduces ﬁrm cash
ﬂow, leading to a decline in investment the following period as well. In this
way, temporary shocks are propagated to subsequent periods.
Export shocks aﬀect the balance of payments through a deterioration of
the trade balance and are ampliﬁed through a decline in capital ﬂows. A
balance of payments crisis occurs when net outﬂows of foreign currency are
greater than the authorities’ holdings of international reserves.
103 Interest rate and exchange rate determina-
tion and the default probability
3.1 Introduction
This section shows how the equilibrium interest rate is determined each pe-
riod, based on the risk free interest rate and on ﬁrm default risk. Default
risk depends on three things; the ﬁrm speciﬁc interest rate, expected ag-
gregate demand, and devaluation expectations. Shocks to exports aﬀect
aggregate demand directly, while they aﬀect devaluation expectations both
through their eﬀect on ﬁrm balance sheets (ie. on aggregate wealth) and on
the external account. Central to the analysis is the eﬀect of devaluation ex-
pectations on perceived default risk. This ’exchange rate channel’ highlights
the interaction of balance sheet and external account constraints, in some
cases yielding multiple equilibria.
There are two objectives with this section. One is to examine how shocks
aﬀect the economy and are propagated, and what major factors are at play.
The other is to form a framework to examine how a balance of payments crisis
can occur. As a ﬁn a lc o m m e n t ,n o t et h a ts i n c et h ef o c u so ft h i sp a p e ri so n
crises and the role of interest rate determination, we analyze the equilibrium
in the short run. Note though, that the long run equilibrium can be easily
found, and we include it in the appendix.
3.2 Interest rate determination
Assume that lenders are risk neutral and, due to competition on the loan
market, will set interest rates so that the expected return is equal to that
of a risk free loan. Lenders, based on the distribution of exports and on
beliefs concerning the authorities ability to maintain the exchange rate (ie.
whether IRt > 0), form expectations concerning the probability that a ﬁrm
will default on its loan. In case of default12,l e n d e r s( a n dﬁrms) receive
nothing13.
In the following subsection we will derive the default rate. For now,
the probability that ﬁr m sw i l ld e f a u l to nt h e i rl o a n si ss i m p l yd e n o t e da s
12Note that while the level of reserves will aﬀect expected returns, there are no implicit
or explicit guarantees of loans, should a ﬁrm default.
13This is an extreme assumption, which amounts to assuming 100% bankruptcy costs.
In relaxing this assumption, one could assume that, in the case of default, the lender re-
ceives the ﬁrm’s remaining assets minus some fraction (ie. less than one) due to bankruptcy
costs. However, doing this would not change signiﬁcantly the analysis and we assume
here, for simplicity, 100% bankruptcy costs.
11πd
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3.3 Deriving the probability of default
In this section I ﬁnd the threshold value of Xt+1 that forces ﬁrms to default
at time t+1, Xd
t+1, as a function of the interest rate, rt. I will call this
the ’Xd
t+1 curve’. Here I will derive an ’equilibrium Xd
t+1 curve’, where an
individual ﬁrm’s interest rate is equal to the aggregate interest rate. Later,
in analyzing the sustainability of equilibria, the two interest rates will be
allowed to vary from each other.
We ﬁrst ﬁnd the value of exports that gives Bt =0 , as a function of
the exchange rate. The exchange rate can also be expressed as a function
of exports, and the two equations are then used to solve for Xd
t+1,a n dt h e
exchange rate that prevails for Xt+1 = Xd
t+1, which we denote Sd
t+1.
I can start with the wealth equation. Let φ ≡
β
α+β(1−α). ( 4 )c a nt h e nb e
expressed as
Bt+1 = βPH,t+1Yt+1 − rtSt+1Ft
=( 1 − α)φIt+1 + φSt+1Xt+1 − rtSt+1Ft (12)
Then, as mentioned above, shocks to export demand will aﬀect wealth,
both directly and, in the case of a balance of payments crisis, via exchange
rate depreciation. Setting Bt+1 =0in (12) and solving for Xd











Will this value of Xd
t+1 lead to a balance of payments crisis as well as
default? We can also ﬁnd, and do so later, the critical value of Xt+1 that
leads to a crisis, denoted by Xc




t+1 then ’default’ will always be accompanied by ’crisis’
(though the opposite will not always hold - ie. there can be a crisis that does
not result in default). The conditions for which Xc
t+1 >X d
t+1 will in general
12depend on the size of aggregate wealth relative to international reserves14.
Here, we simply note that if there is ’no crisis’ then Sd
t+1 = S =1 ,a n di f
there is ’crisis’ then Sd
t+1 > 1 and we can then ﬁnd Sd
t+1 in the following way.
Consider (10) (where aggregate values are substituted by ’nZ = Z’);




For Rt+1 ≤ 0, the exchange rate is ﬂoated, and the exchange rate adjusts
so that the external account is in balance. Note that for Xt+1 = Xd
t+1,
Bt+1 =0 . Thus in this case capital ﬂows, Ft+1, are zero as well. (14) then
reduces to




and for Rt+1 ≤ 0 (and Xt+1 = Xd







nRt − rtFt + φXd
t+1
(15)
where we can see, unsurprisingly, that the exchange rate is increasing in
foreign debt and decreasing in exports and international reserves.




















t ? In answering this question, we want to look at both equations
under the ﬁxed exchange rate (Xc










φrt−1Ft−1 −(1 −α)It. Xd
t <X c
t implies that Xc
t −Xd








φrt−1Ft−1 +( 1− α)It > 0.
Simplifying, this gives It >F t + 1
nRt−1. And, as a point of reference, for Ft−1 = Ft,w e
have (noting that It = Ft−1 +Bt−1) Bt−1 > 1
nRt−1. Then, the probability of a currency
crisis will be greater than the probability of default if aggregate wealth is greater than
reserves.
15And in the case where default is not accompanied by crisis, we have, Xd
t+1 = 1
φrtFt −
(1 − α)It+1 for ”no crisis”
16It can be shown that, for Rt+1 =0 , Xt+1 = Xd
t+1 (ie. Ft+1 =0 ), It+1 is larger than
Rt, implying that the exchange rate does in fact depreciate.
13The probability that ﬁr m sw i l ld e f a u l ti st h e nπd
t+1 =P r ( Xt+1 ≤ Xd
t+1),o r
F(Xd
t+1),w h e r eF(·) is the cdf of X.
T h ef a i r l ys i m p l er e s u l ti n( 1 6 )a n d( 1 7 )r e ﬂects the fact that, with capital
ﬂows equal to zero at Xt+1 = Xd
t+1, balance sheets and reserves are aﬀected
in much the same way. The eﬀect of Xd
t+1 and rtFt on reserves and balance
sheets are exactly equal in this case, and the eﬀect of investment on reserves
is α
βφ = α
α+β(1−α) and on balance sheets is 1−α
α+β(1−α).
1
φrtFt represents both the eﬀect of ﬁrms own holdings of debt, and that
of aggregate debt levels on the exchange rate. The higher interest rates and
the ratio of debt to exports are, the greater the default rate. The default
rate is also declining in reserves since the greater reserves are, the lower the
likelihood and size of a devaluation.
3.4 Short run equilibrium for r and Xd
Hence, (11) and (16) determine the equilibrium values of rt and Xd
t+1,p r o -
vided that Xd ≤ Xc. For the remainder of this analysis, we assume that
this is the case. If we solve (16) for rt then we have two curves that can be
g r a p h e di n( r,Xd)s p a c e .

















The slope of the RP curve is increasing in Xd
t+1 and approaches 0 at the
lower bound of X, and approaches ∞ at the upper bound of X.F o r v a l u e s
of rt where the wealth constraint is binding, the Xd





µBt. When it is not binding, ﬁrms will choose Ft (or
It+1 = Ft + Bt) such that the expected marginal product of Kt+1 equals rt.
Denote as e rt the critical value of rt for which both the wealth constraint is
binding and the expected marginal product of Kt+1 equals rt.T h e n f o r
rt > e rt, Ft is decreasing in rt, implying that the slope of the Xd
t+1 curve is
increasing.
Figure (1) shows the two curves. They are drawn under the assumption
that at the low solution, the wealth constraint is binding while at the high
solution, it is not. Then, for rt ≤ e rt,t h eXd
t+1 curve is linear, and for rt >














Here we can examine how the curves are aﬀected by a (temporary) neg-
ative shock to exports17, which we depict in ﬁgure (2). Since the RP curve
only depends on r∗,i ti sn o ta ﬀected. A shock to Xt will aﬀect the Xd
t+1
curve in two ways. A negative shock to exports reduces wealth, thus leading
to a decline in inﬂows, Ft. Additionally, the shock, both through its eﬀect
on inﬂo w sa n di t se ﬀect on the trade balance, reduces reserves. Since Ft
falls, the slope of the Xd
t+1 curve increases. What happens to the intercept
depends on the size of reserves relative to foreign debt. To see whether
the intercept increases or decreases in response to a negative shock to ex-
ports, note that ∂Ft
∂Xt = µ∂Bt
∂Xt = µφ and ∂Rt
∂Xt = ∂Ft







t > 0 if Ft >
µ
1+µRt.T h u s , i f Ft >
µ
1+µRt then the inter-
cept will decrease in response to a negative shock. Then, a negative shock
at time t will cause the Xd
t+1 c u r v et or o t a t eu p w a r d s ,a n di tc a ne i t h e rs h i f t
upwards or downwards depending on the ratio of reserves to debt (and on
the wealth multiplier).













4C r i s i s
A sw eh a v en o t e di nt h ei n t r o d u c t i o n ,ac r i s i sc a no c c u ri no n eo ft w ow a y s
in this model18. A crisis can be the unique outcome, ie. regardless of which
equilibrium results for the interest rate a balance of payments crisis occurs at
time t. Here, the combined eﬀect of a fall in exports and a decline in capital
ﬂows depletes reserves and forces the authorities to ﬂoat the currency.
We will argue here that a crisis can occur in an additional way, due to
the existence of multiple equilibria. We will use the analysis of interest rate
equilibrium to examine under what conditions these can occur. We will see
that there can either be one or two (sustainable) equilibrium values of the
interest rate. We characterize the low equilibrium as the ’normal’ equilibrium
(no crisis at time t, low interest rate and default probability, binding wealth
constraint) and the high equilibrium as the ’crisis’ equilibrium (high interest
rate and default probability, possibly a decline in capital ﬂows and balance
of payments crisis). At the high equilibrium it may well be the case that the
wealth constraint is no longer binding. At the high interest rate, a single
ﬁrm’s investment demand may be so low that the ﬁrm does not loan up to
18Additionally, a ’sudden stop’ in inﬂows can occur (in which there is no solution to
the interest rate). In this case, lenders are not able to gain the required return for any
interest rate, and stop lending. While it is potentially interesting, we will abstract from
this possibility in this paper.
16the maximum. The abrupt increase in interest rates and decline in capital
ﬂows will have adverse eﬀects on wealth and aggregate demand in t+1 and
following periods. Importantly, the extent of the damage from a switch to
the high equilibrium will depend greatly on whether the decline in capital
ﬂows results in a crisis at time t.
As an additional comment, note here that while we are deriving the prob-
ability of default at time t+1, our interest is also in how the determination
of (rt,Xd
t+1) aﬀects the outcome at time t.
4.1 Crisis as the unique outcome
Here we examine the case where a crisis occurs for any Ft ≤ µBt.H e r e w e
can ﬁnd the threshold value of exports that leads to crisis (denoted by Xc
t)
m u c hi nt h es a m ew a ya sf o rXd. While the derivation of Xd is central to the
determination of the interest rate, Xc
t is more for illustrative purposes. In
determining the probability of a balance of payments crisis, we can highlight
the ’multiplier eﬀect’ of balance sheet eﬀects. Given the constructs of the
model, this eﬀect is perhaps unsurprising. However, the basic story is not
without relevance.
In the period leading up to the crisis in East Asia, capital ﬂows and in-
vestment reached their highest level19. Shortly thereafter, these countries
experienced a large fall in demand for their exports20. This had a substan-
tial (negative) impact on ﬁrm (and bank) balance sheets. In this situation,
international lenders may have been very reluctant to maintain previous lev-




Let us here derive Xc
t, under the condition that Ft = µBt. Then, inserting
Ft = µBt = µ[(1 − α)φIt + φStXt − rt−1StFt−1] into (10) and rearranging,
19See eg. IMF (1997). Additionally, some recent data (1993-1997) on exports, short
term debt and international reserves, which we will discuss below, are included in the
appendix.
20See again, IMF (1997). Among the ’shocks’ noted at this time were: i) a decline in
export demand; ii) the appreciation of the US dollar, to which most of these economies

















A shock to exports, through its adverse eﬀects on output and prices, reduces
ﬁrm revenues. (1+µ) indicates the multiplier eﬀect of exports on the external
account via balance sheets, while φ indicates the impact of exports on the
trade balance.



















A devaluation then occurs for Xt ≤ Xc
t and the crisis probability is Pr(
IRt ≤ 0) = F(Xc
t),w h e r eF(·) is the cdf of Xt. Clearly, important factors
aﬀe c t i n gt h er i s ko fc r i s i si nt h i sc a s ea r et h er a t i oo ff o r e i g nd e b tt oe x p o r t s ,
the interest rate, and reserves. If foreign debt is high relative to exports,
then the maintenance of the currency peg will depend to a large extent on the
continued inﬂow of capital, and on exports. A fall in either can lead to a large
decline in reserves. Here, we have a fall in both. In the absence of credit
market imperfections, the shock to exports at time t would have no eﬀect
on the expected return to Kt+1. Yet, due to credit market imperfections,
it results in a decline in capital ﬂows. Reserves provide a cushion, or extra
’liquidity’, against temporary shocks, reducing to some extent dependence
on continued inﬂows.
What happens then, if capital ﬂows are insuﬃcient to sustain the currency
peg? The devaluation means that capital ﬂows will fall even more21.T a k e
(20), and setting Rt =0and solving for the exchange rate, we have in this
case (where, as opposed to earlier with Sd








nRt−1 − (1 + µ)[rt−1Ft−1 − φXt]
(22)
[rt−1Ft−1 − φXt] indicates the eﬀect of the devaluation on ﬁrm balance sheets
and (1 + µ) the multiplier eﬀect on the exchange rate. The greater the
exchange rate depreciation, the larger the fall in wealth and thus also capital
ﬂows. And the larger the decline in capital ﬂows, the greater the exchange
rate depreciation.
21ie. in addition to the decline caused by the fall in exports.
18The initial eﬀect of the crisis will depend on the oﬀsetting eﬀects of the
shock to exports and on the resulting devaluation. The shock to exports
depresses both output and prices. The initial eﬀect of a devaluation is an
increase in the price of the home good and in output, through increases in
both St and PH,t.
The main costs of the crisis are incurred in period t+1. The decline in
balance sheets, Bt, severely restricts intermediate goods purchases in period
t+1, depressing aggregate demand. Thus, Bt+1 is also below pre-crisis levels
and gradually recovers thereafter.
4.2 The existence of multiple equilibria
We have found that there are in general22 two solutions to rt and Xd
t+1.A r e
both solutions sustainable equilibria? As a starting point, take the two
solutions depicted in ﬁgure (1). Suppose that the economy consists of only
one ﬁrm. It is clear in this case that the high solution is not a competitive
equilibrium. The decline in the interest rate, both by reducing the ﬁrm’s
debt burden and by reducing the risk of crisis, lowers the default rate to such
an extent that the lender’s expected return increases (ie. the Xd
t+1 curve is
above the RP curve). Competition will then drive the interest rate down to
the point where the expected return equals the foreign interest rate, ie. to
the low equilibrium.
In considering the problem of an individual ﬁrm, aggregate values of the
interest rate, debt and reserves are taken as given. Changes in the ﬁrm’s
own interest rate now have a much smaller eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s default rate,
since they aﬀect only the ﬁrm’s own debt burden and not exchange rate
expectations. To analyze this further, consider the problem of an individual
ﬁrm, taking average levels of rt and Ft (denoted by rH
t , FH
t )a sg i v e n 23.T h i s
implies an ’aggregate’ default threshold of X
d,H
t+1, as in (16) and also that for
any Xt+1 <X
d,H










t +φXt+1. The lender can then calculate the
single ﬁr m ’ sd e f a u l tr a t e( o rXd
t+1 curve) which will depend both on the ﬁrm
speciﬁci n t e r e s tr a t ea n do na v e r a g el e v e l s . F r o mt h ew e a l t he q u a t i o nw e
22Either two solutions or no solution, in which case ﬁrms are rationed from the loan
market.
23Ie. the individual lender believes that aggregate levels of rt and Ft (and Rt)a r ea t
the high equilibrium.
24This will be the most important case to examine in checking the sustainability of the
high equilibrium. To be more precise, we are interested in whether lowering the ﬁrm
speciﬁc interest rate and thus also the default rate (ie. so that Xt+1 <X
d,H
t+1), the lender






St+1. Inserting St+1 and rearranging, we
















The ﬁrm speciﬁc default rate is dependent on average values, rH
t FH
t ,a n d
is less sensitive to changes in the ﬁrm speciﬁc interest rate as opposed to
both interest rates (ie. both the ﬁrm speciﬁc and aggregate interest rates).






















(24) then forms a ’ﬁrm speciﬁc Xd
t+1 curve’. Since the ﬁrm speciﬁc Xd
t+1
curve is steeper than the equilibrium Xd
t+1 curve26, it is ’less sensitive’ to
changes in the ﬁrm speciﬁc interest rate. The question of sustainability of
the high equilibrium boils down to - ’how steep’? The high equilibrium is
sustainable if a decline in the ﬁrm speciﬁc interest rate reduces the lenders
expected return. This will be the case if, at the high equilibrium, the
slope of the ﬁrm speciﬁc Xd
t+1 curve is steeper than that of the RP curve27.
Otherwise, if the slope of the ﬁrm speciﬁc Xd
t+1 curve is not steeper than
that of the RP curve at the high equilibrium, then the high equilibrium is
not sustainable. The two cases are depicted in ﬁgures (3) and (4). In
ﬁgure (3), the equilibrium is not sustainable; in ﬁgure (4), it is, and there
are multiple equilibria.
What makes the potential for multiple equilibria more likely? From the
above discussion, the lower the slope of the RP curve at the ’high’ solution,
the greater the scope for multiple equilibria. Important determinants are
then levels of foreign debt and reserves. The greater foreign debt relative
to (the mean value of) exports, the lower the slope of the Xd
t+1 curve, and
the lesser international reserves, the lower is the intercept. Both these
factors tend toward a lower high solution, making it more likely that it is a
sustainable equilibrium.
25We can observe that for rt <r H
t , Ft >F H
t .F o r rt close to rH
t , the diﬀerence is
negligible and we will ignore the eﬀect on rt of Ft 6= FH
t .
26We can note that the slope of a ’equilibrium Xd
t+1 curve’, rt =
φ
FtXd
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Figure 4
This seems intuitively reasonable, since with high levels of foreign debt,
both the size and probability of devaluation become greater, increasing the
inﬂuence of aggregate factors on ﬁrm balance sheets. The external account’s
role is then central here in determining whether there are multiple equilibria.
For low values of Ft relative to exports (or high Rt), the external account
is not very vulnerable, either to external shocks or to sudden increases in
the interest rate. The risk of devaluation is diminished in this case and the
’exchange rate channel’, which is the way in which the external account inﬂu-
ences ﬁrm balance sheets, is reduced. Then, the economy is not vulnerable
to multiple equilibria and changes in market expectations.
For high levels of foreign debt, the exchange rate channel is much stronger.
High aggregate values of foreign debt increase both the risk of devaluation
and the size of the depreciation for a given level of exports. This both
r e s u l t si na ni n c r e a s ei nt h eﬁrm speciﬁc default rate (compared to that with
no exchange rate eﬀect) and means that the ﬁrm speciﬁc default rate is more
sensitive to aggregate variables than to the ﬁrm speciﬁc interest rate.
We see then that the existence of multiple equilibria depends on funda-
mental factors, namely the ratio of foreign debt to exports and foreign debt
to reserves. In the presence of high levels of foreign debt, a change in market
sentiment can result in an abrupt rise in the interest rate.
The outcome of a change in equilibria will also depend crucially on funda-
mental factors, namely whether the level of exports and reserves are suﬃcient
to sustain the exchange rate in the face of a decline in inﬂows. Suppose ﬁrst
21that there is a fall in market sentiment and it results in the high equilib-
rium, with (rH
t ,FH
t ), and that the authorities are still able to maintain the
exchange rate (St = S =1 ). The increase in interest rates reduces lending
which results in lower It+1. The decline in demand for inputs combined with
large interest costs hurts ﬁrm balance sheets, Bt+1, implying that investment
and output will be depressed in the following periods as well.
Now suppose the decline in inﬂows (FH
t )l e a d st oac r i s i sa tt i m et 28.
The devaluation increases the domestic currency value of debt (rt−1StFt−1),
damaging ﬁrm balance sheets at time t, Bt.S i n c e It+1 = Bt + FH
t , It+1
falls further as a result of the devaluation. Furthermore, the exchange rate
depreciation and resulting increase in PH,t mean that real input purchases
fall even more. Saddled with debt and a deeper contraction in demand,
wealth falls further as a result of the devaluation.
4.3 Discussion
What are the main implications of the model? First, ignoring balance sheet
eﬀects may lead to a signiﬁcant underestimation of the adverse eﬀects of
external shocks such as those that hit East Asian economies. While surges
in capital ﬂows and enhanced access to global capital markets may have
beneﬁts in terms of output growth, they also generate an acute need for the
sustenance of those inﬂows. With balance sheet eﬀects, an external shock
will not only impact the trade balance, it may also lead to a substantial
decline in capital ﬂows. Currency mismatches between ﬁrm revenues and
liabilities can result in negative eﬀects of a devaluation, and further increase
the size of the exchange rate depreciation.
This is particularly the case when a country is limited in its access to for-
eign currency29. Low levels of international reserves then make the economy
28Does the high solution imply a crisis at time t? Can Ft fall enough to precipitate a










t is the minimum amount of capital ﬂows needed to sustain the ﬁxed exchange rate.
Fc
t may be negative; ie. reserves and exports are high enough that no crisis is possible at
time t, even for a complete stop in inﬂows. However, with low reserves relative to foreign
debt and a negative shock to exports (ie. less than mean), it can very well be that the
high solution will result in a crisis at time t.
29Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (2000) note the widespread inablility of emerging and
developing countries to loan abroad in their own currency (with the notable exception of
South Africa).
22vulnerable to crises. While there is in general some disagreement over the
role of reserves in terms of maintaining a ﬁxed exchange rate, they have been
found to be strong indicators of ﬁnancial crises30.
Finally, high levels of foreign currency debt create vulnerability to changes
in market sentiment that can lead to a sudden increase in the interest rate,
a decline in capital ﬂows and possibly, crisis.
Some anecdotal support can be gained for the relevance of this approach
by examining developments in some of the variables highlighted in this anal-
y s i s . T h et a b l e si nt h ea p p e n d i xl i s ts o m es t y l i z e df a c t sf o rt h eE a s tA s i a n
countries hit by crisis. The general picture shows strong growth in exports
that suddenly comes to a halt in 1996 and 1997. At the same time, short
term external debt more than doubles in this short period, also increasing
relative to international reserves31. This then suggests that these countries
were hit by signiﬁcant external shocks, at a time when they had greatly
increased their dependence on capital ﬂows.
The model here shows how both the existence of multiple equilibria and
the eﬀects of a change in market sentiment depend on fundamentals, and
have done so from the perspective of an individual lender. However, as in
many other models with multiple equilibria, we do not incorporate into the
model how this change in expectations occurs. A potential source for this
change may lie in information problems32. In addition to sharing a number
of other common characteristics, East Asian countries may also borrow from
the same lenders. In the presence of incomplete information, a deterioration
of conditions in, eg. Thailand, may cause a reassessment of expectations
concerning other economies in the region33.
5 Extensions and conclusion
A main task of crisis theories is in explaining how small shocks can have
large eﬀects. In this paper I have focussed on two factors that magnify the
eﬀect of shocks: balance sheet diﬃculties under imperfect credit markets, and
the interaction of external and balance sheet constraints to produce multiple
equilibria. In an economy where ﬁrms are credit constrained, capital ﬂows
30See, in particular, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
31As an additional comment, due to forward market interventions, the level of interna-
tional reserves may overstate the amount of funds the central banks had with which to
defend their currencies. For example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998b) report that
Thailand eﬀectively had only 2 billion out of its 30 billion dollars of reserves available to
defend the currency.
32See, eg. Morris and Shin (2000), Morris and Shin (1998).
33For an empirical analysis on this, see Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000).
23will be inﬂuenced by the state of ﬁrm balance sheets. A shock to export
demand is magniﬁed by this balance sheet eﬀect through a decline in capital
ﬂows. Additionally, this balance sheet eﬀect will increase the size of a
devaluation in a crisis, as the exchange rate depreciation worsens ﬁrm balance
sheets further.
When ﬁrms borrow in foreign currency, devaluation expectations are an
important factor in determining the riskiness of loans. In this model, where
the authorities are unable to borrow foreign currency to support the exchange
rate, exchange rate expectations are aﬀected greatly by aggregate levels of
foreign debt due for repayment. When foreign debt is high relative to ex-
ports, then changes in market expectations can be self sustaining - if an
individual lender is concerned that average interest rates will increase, rais-
ing the aggregate foreign debt burden, then the lender will also raise interest
rates, validating the lenders’ concerns.
This analysis can be extended in a number of ways. Here I brieﬂyd i s c u s s
two. In the paper I have assumed a ﬁx e dw e a l t hc o n s t r a i n t . W h a tw o u l d
happen if it instead had been derived within the model? For example, we
can pose an ex post moral hazard problem as in work by Aghion, Bacchetta
and Banerjee34, and extend it to account for uncertainty and default risk.
T h i sw o u l dt h e ni m p l yt h a tµ is decreasing in the interest rate and risk of
default. The basic results of the analysis would not be aﬀected signiﬁcantly.
However, the analysis of default risk becomes more interesting. The eﬀect
of a shock on capital ﬂo w st h e ni sn o tas i m p l em u l t i p l eo ft h ec h a n g ei nﬁrm
wealth. Changes in default risk also aﬀect the amount of capital ﬂows. For
example, if a negative shock to exports increases default risk, then capital
ﬂows will not only fall due to a decline in ﬁrm wealth, but also due to an
increase in interest rates.
This model can also be used to discuss the eﬀects of a ﬁnancial liberal-
ization. Suppose that taxes on foreign investment are removed, resulting
in a decline in interest rates. What are the eﬀects? The drop in interest
rates results in an increase in both ﬁrm wealth and international reserves,
which in turn implies a lower default risk. The sum result would be greater
ﬁrm wealth, capital ﬂows, investment, reserves - overall, very positive eﬀects.
Though, there is one exception, however. There is a danger to this ’liberal-
ization’ despite the fact that reserves increase. The increase in capital ﬂows,
and hence also the ratio of foreign debt to exports, makes the economy more
vulnerable to changes in market sentiment, and multiple equilibria.
34eg. Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (1999), Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2000).
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251 Tables on Exports, External Debt and Re-
serves
Exports35 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Thailand 46940 56132 69440 70625 47903
Korea 94572 114094 147118 146254 92869
Philippines 16692 23450 26438 33464 29724
Malaysia 50194 67879 82165 91842 67535
Indonesia 42274 46897 53185 58717 60106
Short Term Debt 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Thailand 22437 32184 47569 49115 42946
Korea 31266 43008 55818 69181 61356
Philippines 4736 4465 5743 9109 13300
Malaysia 9508 8732 13948 19361 22282
Indonesia 21306 23817 30470 37180 38103
Debt/Reserves36 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Thailand 0.92 1.10 1.32 1.30 1.64
K o r e a 1 . 5 51 . 6 81 . 7 12 . 0 33 . 0 1
Philippines 1.01 0.74 0.90 0.91 1.83
Malaysia 0.34 0.34 0.59 0.72 1.07
I n d o n e s i a 1 . 8 91 . 9 62 . 2 22 . 0 42 . 3 0
2 Solving for the steady state under the ﬁxed
exchange rate
Here we ﬁnd the steady state under the following assumptions: the exchange
rate is ﬁxed, the wealth constraint is binding, the interest rate is determined
by the low equilibrium as given above, and realized exports are equal to their
mean value.
We can start with ﬁrm wealth. Solving for Bt+1 in terms of Bt and Xt+1,
we have
Bt+1=[φ(1 − α)(1+µ)−µrt]Bt+φXt+1 (25)
Then, using Ft+1 = µBt+1 and (25), Rt+1 can then be expressed in terms
35Exports from IFS. Short term debt (under 1 year) to BIS banks, from joint BIS-
IMF-OECD-World Bank External Debt Statistics. All values in millions of US dollars.
Availability for debt statistics determined time period used here.
36Ratio of short term debt (above) to International Reserves. Reserves from joint
BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank External Debt Statistics.
26of Rt, Bt and Xt+1;

















Bt+(1 + µ)φXt+1 (26)
(25) and (26) form the dynamic system for the model, after having inserted
the solution for the equilibrium interest rate. Using the RP and Xd
t+1curves,
and using Ft = µBt, we can see that the equilibrium interest rate can be
expressed as rt = rt(r∗,X t,B t,R t,α,β,µ). In steady state it becomes r =
r(r∗,X,B,R,α,β,µ). To solve for the steady state, set Bt+1 = Bt = B and
then in the absence of shocks to Xt we have, B =
φ
[1−φ(1+µ)+µr]X.N o t et h a t




α+β(1−α) . Setting this in, we get
B =
β
µr(α + β(1 − α)) + α − µβ(1 − α)
X (27)
Setting Rt+1 = Rt = R we have in the absence of shocks to Xt,










After inserting the solution for B we have, φX = φX.T h u s , t h e v a l u e o f B
that solves (25) for Bt+1 = Bt, gives also Rt+1 = Rt.
27